US Was Warned of Telecoms Risk Years Before Salt Typhoon Hack
The U.S. government was warned four years ago that security weaknesses in national telecommunications networks had created a “perilous” situation and left the country vulnerable to foreign spies, but it fought to keep a report detailing those concerns secret and didn’t address its findings, according to interviews and documents reviewed by Bloomberg News.
A June 2022 report commissioned by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency concluded that U.S. telecommunications networks contained “major structural vulnerabilities” that had created national security risks. “The fact that U.S. national networks can be readily compromised from anywhere in the world is not yet widely understood,” states the report.
The report, which was disclosed as part of a lawsuit and reviewed by Bloomberg, was produced more than two years before revelations that a suspected Chinese hacking group known as Salt Typhoon had breached at least nine major U.S. telecommunications and broadband providers, including Verizon, AT&T and Lumen Technologies. The intruders targeted the phones of top politicians — including then presidential candidate Donald Trump — in what U.S. officials described as the one of the worst cyber espionage cases in the recent history.
The Salt Typhoon hackers used an obscure telecom protocol called SS7, or Signaling System 7, which was one of the vulnerabilities identified in the report, for some early reconnaissance efforts, said a former U.S. official familiar with the breaches. But they didn’t exploit it to gain access to U.S. telecommunications networks, according to the person, and a second former official familiar with the matter. Both spoke on the condition they not be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter.
CISA withheld the report from public release for four years and resisted congressional pressure to publish it. Still, Senator Ron Wyden, a Democrat from Oregon whose office was briefed on the report’s findings in 2023 and pushed for its release, said it advocated an overhaul that could have helped shore up U.S. networks.
“Had this report been made public when it was first written in 2022, Congress would have had ample time to require mandatory cybersecurity standards for phone companies, in time to prevent the Salt Typhoon hacks,” Wyden said in a statement last year. In a statement to Bloomberg this week, he said, “It is totally inexcusable that CISA stonewalled releasing this report for four years, while adversaries were spying on Americans.”
After fighting against its release, CISA provided a redacted version of the report to Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, which sued to get it under the Freedom of Information Act. The details of the report haven’t been previously reported.
A CISA spokesperson declined to comment. Responding to EPIC’s lawsuit in court, the agency argued that the report contained privileged information and was exempt from disclosure. CISA said it didn’t act to adopt the report’s recommendations because “it makes technical claims without presenting the supporting information necessary to verify the claims.”
CTIA, an industry trade group formerly known as the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, said the report contains no new findings affecting U.S. network security. “SS7 is not used in the 4G or 5G networks that Americans rely on daily for connectivity,” the group said in a statement, adding that the vulnerability has already been addressed through best practices and investments in “advanced wireless networks.”
Jeramie Scott, director of EPIC’s surveillance oversight program, accused the U.S. government of doing little to address the problems outlined in the report, even as it “knows these vulnerabilities are actively being exploited by bad actors.” “The government has seemingly spent more effort trying to keep this report from the public than trying to protect the public against these known risks,” he said.
Kevin Briggs, a former senior CISA official involved in commissioning the report, said in an interview that he had repeatedly advocated inside the agency for it to be published and circulated among lawmakers. But he said his efforts were blocked by his superiors. Briggs said they told him that releasing the report would have a negative impact on CISA’s relationship with the telecommunications industry due to its criticisms of the sector’s cybersecurity and recommendations for greater regulation.
“Telecommunication is entwined with all of our infrastructure — it’s business intelligence, it’s national security, it’s financial,” said Briggs, who was laid off from CISA last year amid sweeping federal cuts made by Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency. “If you can get into telecommunication networks and monitor or disrupt, you can potentially get into everything. We have to fix these things.”
The 111-page report, titled “US telecommunications insecurity 2022,” focuses in large part on technical vulnerabilities in SS7, a sort of switchboard for the global telecommunications industry that is used to route communications between phone networks.
First developed in the 1970s, SS7 contains numerous known vulnerabilities that governments and private surveillance companies have targeted to spy on phone calls and text messages, in addition to tracking people’s locations. Bloomberg News has previously reported on instances in which SS7 has been exploited to conduct covert surveillance of people’s mobile phones.
Firewalls and other available technologies can block SS7-based surveillance from occurring, but these aren’t uniformly implemented by all network operators. According to the report, the U.S. is vulnerable to surveillance that exploits flaws in SS7, partly because there are many different telecommunications operators across the country, including small rural carriers, with varying levels of security. That means more “entry points” for bad actors, the report says.
The report says its findings were based on a review of up to 50 billion daily “telecom events,” and it concluded that the U.S. was the most targeted country in the world in terms of “cyber exploits” seeking to exploit telecom protocols such as SS7. It cites outdated regulation and the complexity of the U.S. telecommunications system as reasons for “this perilous and untenable situation for the U.S. and those responsible for its protection.”
Several people in the U.S. were apparently surveilled in espionage operations, according to the report. In March 2022, the report links an unnamed nation-state security agency to a case in which an individual carrying a Cyprus-registered mobile device was singled out for surveillance while apparently in Indianapolis. In another instance, in April 2022, phones linked to three people in the U.S. were targeted in attempts to “covertly acquire the locations of the devices involved,” according to the report.
It also hints at the scope of the potential surveillance. During one week in May 2022, the report identified 9,000 suspicious incidents across U.S. phone networks that it linked to several unnamed “malicious entities.” Some of the surveillance attempts outlined in the report were traced to an unnamed group in Southeast Asia.
The redacted version of the report reviewed by Bloomberg News excludes dozens of company names and other specific details, including recommendations for the telecom industry. But the report includes some unique codes associated with particular telecom companies, which can be used to identify them.
One of them, Texas-based Choice Wireless, was detected transporting “malicious signaling traffic,” a term defined in the report as attempts to conduct surveillance, such as eavesdropping on calls or messages and tracking locations.
Two people familiar with the report’s findings said that Choice had been flagged as a security concern because, according to the report, it had a commercial relationship with a Cypriot-Israeli company called Inno Networks. Inno’s chairman was also a cofounder of a surveillance technology company called Circles, known for selling governments services that enable them to spy on mobile phones. Circles has supplied surveillance services to several governments in authoritarian countries, according to advocacy groups.
Choice and other small U.S. mobile operators had leased network infrastructure to foreign entities, according to the report. The foreign entities then allegedly used the leased networks as a kind of cloak that would hide their true intentions and identities. They connected to other American telecommunications networks while exploiting vulnerabilities in the SS7 protocol to conduct surveillance of people, according to the report, which added that it’s unclear whether Choice Wireless knew its network may have been commandeered for espionage.
Representatives of Choice Wireless and Inno Networks didn’t respond to requests for comment. Circles also didn’t respond to a request for comment.
The report was produced for CISA by AdaptiveMobile Security, a unit of Swedish cybersecurity company Enea AB, which specializes in telecom network security, and Telecom Defense, a U.S.-based telecom cybersecurity company.
The issues described in the report are “more relevant than ever,” said John Hughes, head of Enea’s network security unit, pointing to more recent company research on how hackers linked to China have targeted vulnerabilities in interconnected mobile networks. “The uncomfortable reality is that weaknesses in telecom networks have been exploited for years,” Hughes said in an emailed statement. “Pretending otherwise doesn’t make networks safer.”
Brian Collins, who led Enea’s AdaptiveMobile Security unit at the time the report was authored, said that if CISA had questions about the evidence then agency staff could have verified it “with a couple of simple phone calls.”
Jean Gottschalk, founder of Telecom Defense, declined to comment on the report, citing a nondisclosure agreement he’d signed.
Briggs, a former U.S. Air Force officer and Federal Emergency Management Agency official, spent a decade in various roles at the Department of Homeland Security before he joined CISA in 2018 and became a senior advisor on telecommunications security. The 69-year-old said he became increasingly concerned about SS7 vulnerabilities in U.S. networks after he discovered a case in 2018 in which a Middle Eastern government allegedly exploited the flaw to target a Florida resident for surveillance.
In May 2024, frustrated at CISA’s lack of action, Briggs provided a statement to the Federal Communications Commission, in which he indirectly referenced the report and tried to raise alarm. The FCC was at the time seeking comments from experts on security issues around SS7 in U.S. networks.
Briggs said in the statement to the FCC that he had seen information indicating that there had been “numerous incidents of successful, unauthorized attempts to access the network user location data” of people in the U.S. These, he wrote, were just the “tip of the proverbial iceberg.”
A spokesperson for the FCC didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Briggs’ aim in speaking publicly about these issues, he said, was not to embarrass CISA, the FCC, or the telecommunications industry, but to “help protect Americans, government leaders, military and intelligence personnel, businesses, and the essential national functions that depend upon telecommunications.”
Top photo: Fiber cables at an AT&T office in Dallas. Photographer: Shelby Tauber/Bloomberg.
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